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We assess the effects of geographic expansion on bank efficiency using cost and profit efficiency for over 
7,000 U.S. banks, 1993-1998.  We find that parent organizations exercise some control over the efficiency of 
their affiliates, although this control tends to dissipate with distance to the affiliate.  However, on average, 
distance-related efficiency effects tend to be modest, suggesting that some efficient organizations can overcome 
any effects of distance.  The results imply there may be no particular optimal geographic scope for banking 
organizations ￿ some may operate efficiently within a single region, while others may operate efficiently on a 
nationwide or international basis. 
 
JEL classification codes: G21, G28, G34, G38 








The banking industry is consolidating around the globe in response to regulatory changes and other 
factors.  The U.S. banking structure has not yet fully adapted to the Riegle-Neal Act, which permits bank 
branching on almost a nationwide basis, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which permits relatively 
unrestricted universal banking powers for well-capitalized financial holding companies.  In the European 
Union, the financial structure has not yet fully adapted to the Single Market Programme, which essentially 
allows continent-wide universal banking with a single license, and monetary union, which provides for a single 
currency for most of the continent.  In Asia, consolidation is occurring in reaction to recent banking and 
financial crises.  These changing factors, along with the globalization of financial markets in general, have also 
created opportunities for intercontinental financial organization mergers and acquisitions (M&As).  In most 
cases, the consolidation activity involves geographic expansion ￿ financial organizations expanding to other 
locations within their home regions; into other regions within their home nation; or into other host nations, any 
of which may be considerable distances away. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of this geographic expansion on bank efficiency.  On 
the one hand, geographic expansion may allow efficiently managed institutions to ￿export￿ their superior 
managerial skills and policies and procedures to distant affiliates; take advantage of network economies; and 
exploit the benefits of geographic risk diversification.  On the other hand, operating a far-flung banking empire 
may reduce efficiency as senior managers stray into markets in which they have less core competence; as 
organizational diseconomies arise (such as agency problems in monitoring junior managers in a distant locale); 
and as distance makes providing relationship-based services to local customers more difficult.  We investigate 
these effects of geographic expansion on efficiency by addressing three related questions: 
1)  Can parent financial organizations control the efficiency of their affiliates by exporting 
their skills/policies/procedures, and does this control vary with distance to the affiliate? 
 
2)  Does the efficiency of an affiliate vary with its distance from its parent organization? 
 
3)  Are some individual financial organizations able to exercise more control and function 
more efficiently as geographically dispersed organizations than others? 
 
It is important to distinguish between the concept of control and the level of efficiency.  More control implies 
that the efficiency of affiliate banks will be more similar to the efficiency of the parent.  That is, the controlling 





We address these questions by conducting three distinct empirical analyses -- a bivariate analysis, a 
regression analysis, and an individual organization analysis.  Each of these analyses uses estimates of cost and 
profit efficiency for over 7,000 U.S. banks from 1993 to 1998.  The data provide an excellent laboratory for 
analyzing the efficiency effects of geographic expansion because the U.S. is a geographically large nation with 
long distances between banks in the same bank holding company (BHC).  Over this time period, banks were 
generally allowed to operate in only one state (although their parent BHCs could own banks in multiple states), 
so the location of the bank is a fairly good indicator of where it operated and achieved its efficiency scores.  
These data allow us to observe how well organizations control the efficiency of distant affiliates and whether 
affiliate efficiency varies with distance from the parent.  Importantly, our observations are not confounded by 
differences in language, culture, currency, regulatory/supervisory structures, etc. that may plague studies of 
banks operating across international borders.   
Our bivariate analysis compares the efficiency of banks located in the same geographic region as their 
parent organization, the efficiency of banks located in geographic regions contiguous to their parents, and the 
efficiency of banks located in regions that are not contiguous to their parents.  We also compare the efficiency 
of home-region banks whose parent organizations own banks only in that same region, home-region banks 
whose parents own banks in contiguous regions, and home-region banks whose parents own banks in 
noncontiguous regions.  Thus, we are able to see how geographic expansion into nearby and far away locations 
affects the efficiency of both distant affiliates and home-region banks.  This analysis primarily addresses 
question (2) above about the relationship between distance and the level of efficiency. 
Our regression analysis focuses on what determines the efficiency of affiliates in multibank holding 
companies.  We regress affiliate bank efficiency on the efficiency of the lead bank in the BHC, the distance 
between the affiliate and the lead bank, and other variables.  Our maintained assumption is that the senior 
management of the organization is located at the lead bank and that the performance of the lead bank is 
representative of the organization￿s skills, policies, and procedures.  We use the coefficient on lead bank 
efficiency as an indicator of parental control; we use the coefficient on distance as an indicator of the effect of 
distance on affiliate efficiency; and we use the coefficient on the interaction of lead bank efficiency and 





questions (1) and (2) above about the effects of organizational control and distance on efficiency.  We also 
estimate subsample regressions for affiliates located in different states than, in different regions from, and in 
regions noncontiguous to, their parents.  By testing whether organizations that choose greater geographic scope 
tend to be those that are relatively good at exercising control at a distance, these regressions address question 
(3) above about whether some individual organizations are better at control and efficiency than others. 
Our individual organization analysis focuses on the efficiency of individual banking organizations, as 
opposed to the bivariate and regression analyses, which focus on the efficiency of the average bank affiliate.  
We start by identifying all BHCs with 10 or more affiliates in our data.  From that group, we identify ￿efficient 
BHCs￿ whose affiliates tend to operate with above-average efficiency regardless of where they are located ￿ in 
the BHC￿s home state, in the BHC￿s home region, or in regions contiguous or noncontiguous to the BHC￿s 
home region.  Finally, we check to see whether any one particular geographic strategy ￿ such as statewide, 
regional, or superregional banking ￿ is predominant among these efficient BHCs.  This analysis primarily 
addresses question (3) above about whether some individual institutions are better at control and efficiency 
than others. 
Of the three analyses, we put the greatest emphasis on the regression analysis because it is the most 
direct and comprehensive approach to addressing the three questions above.  The bivariate and individual 
organization analyses shed additional light on questions (2) and (3), respectively, and corroborate the findings 
of the regression analysis. 
The paper unfolds as follows.  Section 1 reviews some previous research that has touched on the issues 
of control and distance.  Section 2 discusses the efficiency advantages and disadvantages of geographic 
expansion.  Section 3 explains how we measure bank efficiency and describes our data.  Sections 4, 5, and 6 
present the results of our bivariate, regression, and individual organization analyses, respectively, and explain 
how these results answer the three main research questions asked above.  Section 7 provides brief concluding 
remarks. 
1.  Review of related research literature 
  To our knowledge, no prior research has directly addressed our three main questions about the effects 





that have investigated affiliate efficiency as a function of the efficiency of the parent organization to assess the 
degree of organizational control; none that have measured distances between affiliates and parent organizations 
to assess the effect of distance on efficiency; and none that have examined the patterns of affiliate efficiency 
within individual banking organizations to see if some organizations are able exercise more control and 
function more efficiently as geographically dispersed organizations than others. 
However, some prior research has come close to these issues.  With respect to the control issue, there is 
some research on the effects of BHC affiliation on the efficiency of the organization as a whole.  While 
efficiency of the organization is not the same concept as control, it would be expected that organizations in 
which senior management is able to exercise more control would also be more efficient, all else equal.  The 
empirical results are mixed.  For example, some studies found that banks in BHCs are more efficient than 
independent banks (e.g., Spong, Sullivan, and DeYoung 1995, Mester 1996).  In contrast, other research 
suggested that branch banking organizations are more efficient than multibank BHCs (e.g., Grabowski, 
Rangan, and Rezvanian 1993), and that for a given organization size, a greater number of separate bank 
charters reduces the market value of the organization (Klein and Saidenberg 2000). 
Some inference on the control issue may also be gleaned from the research on the efficiency of bank 
branches.  If senior management is able to effectively control the operations of individual branches, then the 
efficiencies of the individual branches would be expected to be clustered near the performance of the best 
practice branch of the bank.  If senior management is not in control, then the efficiencies of the individual 
branches would be expected to be widely dispersed.  Studies of the branching networks of large U.S. banks 
(e.g., Sherman and Ladino 1995, Berger, Leusner, and Mingo 1997) and of a large Canadian bank (Schaffnit, 
Rosen, and Paradi 1997) found efficiencies almost as dispersed as those typically found in studies of unrelated 
banks, consistent with relatively weak control for the senior management of the bank.  In contrast, a number of 
nonparametric efficiency studies that mostly used small numbers of branches (usually for European banks) 
typically found relatively tight distributions of branch efficiency, with mean efficiency exceeding .90 (e.g., 
Sherman and Gold 1985, Zenios, Zenios, Agathocleous, and Soteriou 1996, Parkan 1987, Oral and Yolalan 
1990, Vassiglou and Giokas 1990, Giokas 1991, Al-Faraj, Alidi, and Bu-Bshait 1993, Pastor 1993, Tulkens 





could reflect very tight managerial control over branch operations or it could alternatively reflect a problem 
with nonparametric methods that arises when the number of observations is relatively small. 
Some research has examined the effects of geographic expansion within a nation of banking 
organizations as a whole and found generally favorable effects.  Some found that larger, more geographically 
integrated institutions tend to have better risk-expected return frontiers (e.g., Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon 
1996, 1999, Demsetz and Strahan 1997).  Others found that banking organization M&As raise profit efficiency 
in a way consistent with the benefits of improved geographic diversification, but does not have much effect on 
cost efficiency (e.g., Berger and Humphrey 1992, Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey 1997, Berger 1998).  
These studies generally found that the difference in efficiency between the acquirer and target had relatively 
little effect on overall efficiency improvement following consolidation, suggesting that the ability of acquirers 
to export superior skills/policies/procedures to targets may be limited.  However, these studies did not examine 
the efficiency of the individual affiliates of the organizations, did not directly address the issue of intra-
organizational control, and did not measure the distance from the parent organization. 
Other research has examined efficiency across international borders, which is usually associated with 
significant geographic expansion.  Most studies found that foreign affiliates in a host nation are less efficient 
on average than the domestic banks in that nation (e.g., DeYoung and Nolle 1996, Hasan and Hunter 1996, 
Mahajan, Rangan, and Zardkoohi 1996, Chang, Hasan, and Hunter 1998, Miller and Parkhe 1999, Parkhe and 
Miller 1999, Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell 2000), while some found that foreign institutions have about 
the same average efficiency as domestic institutions (e.g., Vander Vennet 1996, Bhattacharya, Lovell, and 
Sahay 1997, Hasan and Lozano-Vivas 1998).  These findings would appear to conflict with the within-nation 
results cited above, in which geographic expansion appeared to be favorable on balance.  However, as noted 
above, cross-border expansion is also associated with other potential barriers to efficiency ￿ such as differences 
in language, culture, currency, regulatory/supervisory structures ￿ which are difficult to disentangle from the 
effects of geographic expansion in these studies. 
Some of the cross-border studies implicitly addressed the issue of control by studying the effects of the 
identity of the home nation of the parent organization.  The limited findings suggested that the foreign affiliates 





2000), and that efficiency was higher when the home nation and host nation had more similar economic 
environments (e.g., Miller and Parkhe 1999, Parkhe and Miller 1999).  The first result is consistent with the 
possibility that some home nation market or supervisory/regulatory conditions in the U.S. may aid in the 
control of foreign affiliates.  The second result is consistent with the possibility that having similar market or 
supervisory/regulatory conditions in the home and host nations may aid in the control of foreign affiliates. 
2.  The efficiency advantages and disadvantages of geographic expansion 
The removal of intrastate and interstate geographic restrictions on competition in the U.S. has 
increased the freedom of banking organizations to expand geographically and potentially move towards a more 
efficient structure.  Geographic expansion allows senior management of efficient organizations to spread their 
best practices over more resources.  As stressed above, these efficiency improvements occur when efficient 
organizations are the ones expanding, and whether such efficiency transfers are successful depends on 
management’s ability to control events at a distance.  These gains in managerial efficiency, or X-efficiency, 
may accrue in the form of lower costs of producing a given bundle of financial services, or in the form of 
higher revenues from producing or packaging financial services that are more highly valued by customers, or 
both.  
Geographic expansion may also allow scale or scope efficiencies that reduce costs or enhance 
revenues.  Linking branches, ATMs, and back-office facilities over a larger geographic area may yield network 
economies.  A more geographically broad institution may also be better able to serve business customers that 
have many locations, and may have a broader menu of potential new investment opportunities outside its home 
market. 
In addition, geographic expansion can diversify banking organizations across different regional 
economic environments, reducing the variation in the organizations’ earnings over time.  This can add value by 
improving the organization’s risk-expected return frontier, allowing the bank to increase its average revenues 
by adopting a higher risk, higher expected return investment strategy.  A reduction in risk from diversification 
may also increase the value of the institution￿s financial guarantees (loan commitments, letters of credit, 
derivative contracts) and its capacity to issue them.  On the cost side, greater diversification may reduce the 





liabilities.  The costs of complying with prudential supervision and regulation may also be reduced. 
To provide some insight into the potential benefits from geographic diversification, Table 1 gives 
information about the distribution of bank earnings across geographic regions in the U.S.  The table shows the 
mean return on equity (ROE) for commercial banks located in the eight Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
regions of the U.S. and the correlation of ROE across these regions over the period 1979-1998.  These data 
suggest very strong diversification possibilities from cross-regional consolidation.  Bank earnings in many 
region-pairs have fairly low correlations, including one negative correlation.  Eight of the ten weakest 
correlations are between noncontiguous region-pairs, while seven of the ten strongest correlations are between 
contiguous region-pairs -- indicating that banks have an incentive to expand beyond contiguous regions into 
noncontiguous regions to capture additional diversification gains.  
While geographic expansion is associated with a number of potential efficiency advantages, 
geographic expansion can also potentially reduce efficiency.  Geographic expansion by inefficiently managed 
banks may spread inferior management practices over a greater amount of resources.  As well, otherwise 
competent managers may stray into new geographic markets for which they lack relevant local knowledge, or 
into markets that require skills that lie outside these managers￿ areas of core competence.  Holding managerial 
ability constant, geographic expansion could also result in scale or scope inefficiencies because managing a 
larger, more far-flung empire is more difficult.  Organizational diseconomies may arise because senior 
managers at the headquarters cannot easily monitor managerial effort, service quality, or economic conditions 
at the local level -- that is, there may be significant agency costs in trying to control junior management at a 
distant locale.  As discussed below, providing and monitoring relationship-based small business loans may be 
especially difficult at a distance because of problems in transmitting informal information to a distant 
headquarters.1 
Over time, improvements in information, communications, and financial technologies may partially 
mitigate the efficiency losses related to geographic expansion by making the physical distances between bank 
                                                 
1.  Geographical diversification can also increase financial institution risk.  A bank￿s risk may increase if efficiency is 
reduced for any of the reasons described above or if the additional assets have low expected returns, low capital, and/or 






headquarters and local offices, and between banks and borrowers, less important.  For example, credit scoring 
models and more cost-effective voice and Internet communications appear to have made it easier to analyze 
credit applications and monitor small business borrowers at greater distances.  Consistent with this, one recent 
study found that the distances of small businesses from their banks has been increasing over time (Petersen and 
Rajan 2000).  It seems reasonable that such advances might also make it easier to monitor loan officers and 
other bank personnel at greater distance.   
However, we argue that physical distance matters, will continue to matter in the near future, and that 
technological advances can only partially mitigate the effects, both unfavorable and favorable, of distance on 
bank efficiency.  For example, making relationship loans to borrowers that do not quality for credit scoring 
because of relatively weak financial statements and collateral of questionable value requires local knowledge 
that is difficult to quantify and transmit to a distant headquarters.  This local knowledge includes not only 
financial information about the firm, but information about the firm￿s managers, its local economic 
environment, and its relationships with customers, suppliers, and local competitors.  Because much of this 
information is difficult to quantify and transmit, so that verifying whether local loan performance problems are 
due to adverse local conditions, poor performance of the borrowers, or lax effort/incompetence of local loan 
officers becomes more difficult as distance increases.  In addition, geographic expansion brings potential 
diversification benefits that increase with physical distance, as shown above.  These benefits may accrue to 
banks that provide loans, deposits, or other financial products and services on a multiregional, national, or 
international basis.  It is unlikely that advances in information, communications, and financial technologies will 
smooth out differences in regional economic conditions and fully mitigate these potential efficiency gains from 
geographic expansion. 
3.  Measuring bank efficiency 
We first review the efficiency concepts employed and the methodology for estimating efficiency 
(section 3.1).  We then describe the data and the efficiency estimates (section 3.2). 
3.1  Efficiency concepts and methodology  
                                                                                                                                                             
monitoring).  Bank risk may also increase if return distributions are negatively skewed and the diversification increases 





We estimate cost efficiency and profit efficiency, which measure how well a bank performs relative to 
a best-practice institution that produces the same output bundle under the same exogenous conditions.  Cost 
efficiency is derived from a cost function of the form: 
ln f (w ,y ,z ,v ) + ln  +  ln ,, , , , , C u  i t t i ti ti ti t i
C
it
C =      , ε                                                      (1) 
where C measures bank costs, including both operating and interest expenses; i indexes banks (i=1,N); t 
indexes time (t=1,T); f denotes some functional form; w is the vector of variable input prices faced by the 
bank; y is the vector of its variable output quantities; z indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs (inputs or 
outputs); v is a set of variables measuring the economic environment in the bank￿s local market(s); lnu
C is a 
factor that represents a bank￿s core efficiency; and lnε
C is random error that incorporates both measurement 
error and luck. 
We measure of cost efficiency for bank i by comparing its actual costs (adjusted for random error) to 
the minimum costs necessary to produce bank i’s output and other exogenous variables (w,y,z,v): 
 
where u ˆmin
C is the minimum u ˆi
C across all the banks in the sample.  COSTEFF can be thought of as the 
proportion of costs or resources that are used efficiently.  For example, a bank with COSTEFF = 0.70 is 70% 
efficient, or equivalently wastes 30% of its costs relative to a best practice bank facing the same conditions.  
These inefficiencies may reflect the inferior skills and knowledge of managers and/or the agency costs 
managers acting in their own interests, rather than those of the shareholders.  
We measure profit efficiency based on a profit function with the same arguments as the cost function: 
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π π π ε θ π t i i t i t i t i t i t t t i   u  = +                                                     (3) 
where π is bank profit; θ is a constant that makes π +θ  positive for all banks (so that the log is defined);  lnu
π 
represents the bank￿s core efficiency; and lnε
π is a random error term.  Using techniques similar to those for 
estimating cost efficiency, we construct a measure of profit efficiency for bank i by comparing its actual profits 
(adjusted for random error) to the maximum profits (i.e., the best practice) attainable given bank i's outputs and 
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other exogenous variables (w,y,z,v): 
 
where u ˆmax
π  is the maximum u ˆi
π  across all banks in the sample.  PROFEFF can be thought of as the proportion 
of maximum profits that are earned.  For example, a bank with PROFEFF = 0.70 is 70% efficient, or is 
forgoing about 30% of its potential profits through excessive costs, deficient revenues, or both.  Again, these 
inefficiencies may reflect inferior managers, managers acting in their own interests, or both. 
We use PROFEFF as our main measure of bank performance, because profit efficiency is conceptually 
superior to cost efficiency for evaluating overall firm performance.  Profit efficiency is based on the economic 
goal of profit maximization, which requires that the same amount of managerial attention be paid to raising a 
marginal dollar of revenue as to reducing a marginal dollar of costs.  PROFEFF may also better capture the 
benefits of cross-regional diversification of risk.  As discussed, geographic diversification may increase the 
value of a bank’s financial guarantees and its capacity to issue them, and may allow the bank to enhance its 
expected revenues by making higher risk-higher expected return investments.  These benefits, as well as any 
expense reductions due to a lower cost of capital or a reduction in regulatory compliance costs, are generally 
included in PROFEFF.  We also include COSTEFF primarily to diagnose whether differences in efficiency 
have their origins in cost control or in revenue generation. 
PROFEFF is often called ￿alternative￿ profit efficiency because the profit function in (3) specifies 
output quantities y, rather than output prices p as in a standard profit function.  We use alternative profit 
efficiency rather than standard profit efficiency primarily because output prices are difficult to measure 
accurately for commercial banks, and because output quantities are relatively fixed in the short-run and cannot 
respond quickly to changing prices as is assumed in the standard profit function vary across banks more than 
output prices and thus better explain differences in bank profits.  Prior research generally found similar results 
for estimates of standard and alternative profit efficiency.  See Berger and Mester (1997) for an extended 
discussion of these issues. 
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We estimate both the cost function (1) and profit function (3) separately for each year in our 1993-
1998 panel, allowing the estimated parameters to vary over time.  We apply the distribution-free approach 
(Berger 1993) to the estimates to calculate COSTEFF and PROFEFF.  For each bank, we calculate the six-
year averages of the estimated residual terms (lnu
C + lnε
C) and (lnu
π  + lnε
π ).  The core efficiency terms lnu are 
assumed to remain constant for each bank over time, and the random errors lnε are assumed to tend to average 
out over time.  To reduce the impact of substantial random outliers, we truncated the average residuals at the 5
th 
and 95
th percentiles of the distributions of their size classes.  These truncated distributions of average residuals 
provide us with the variables lnu ˆb
C, lnu ˆb
π , lnu ˆmin
C, and lnu ˆmax
π  used in equations (3) and (5) to calculate a single 
set of cost and profit efficiency measures for each bank over the entire six-year period.2 
We specify the cost and profit functions using the Fourier-flexible functional form.  This hybrid 
functional form combines a conventional translog form with Fourier trigonometric terms.  The resulting form is 
more flexible than the translog, and has been shown to fit the data for U.S. financial institutions better than the 
translog, especially when a relatively small number of extremely large or small banks are present in the data 
(McAllister and McManus 1993, Mitchell and Onvural 1996, Berger, Cummins, and Weiss 1997, Berger and 
DeYoung 1997, and Berger, Leusner, and Mingo 1997).  The cost function includes three variable input prices 
(the local market prices of purchased funds, core deposits, and labor); four variable outputs y (consumer loans, 
business loans, real estate loans, securities); three fixed netputs z (off-balance-sheet activity, physical capital, 
financial equity capital); and an environmental variable STNPL (the ratio of total nonperforming loans to total 
loans in the bank￿s state) to control for the business conditions facing each bank.3  By using local market input 
prices, rather than the prices actually paid by each bank, our COSTEFF and PROFEFF estimates will reflect 
how well individual banks price their deposits and purchased funds.  Specifying financial assets as outputs and 
                                                 
2.  The reasonableness of these assumptions depends on the length of period studied.  If too short a period is chosen the 
random errors might not average out well, and if too long a period is chosen the bank￿s efficiency is less likely to remain 
constant.  Using 1984-1994 data on U.S. commercial banks, DeYoung (1997) found that a six-year time period, such as 
we use here, reasonably balanced these concerns. 
3.  The variable input prices are average prices for the state or region in which the bank was located, and are constructed 
by dividing a bank￿s expenditures on the input in questions by the quantity purchased of that input, and then taking the 
asset-weighted average across the banks in that state or region.  The variable loan outputs are measured gross of 
allowances for uncollectable loans.  The variable securities output is measured as gross total assets less loans and 
physical capital; and the fixed off-balance sheet output is measured by the risk-weighted (based on the Basle Accord risk 





financial liabilities and physical factors as inputs is consistent with the intermediation approach or the asset 
approach to modeling bank production (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). 
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       (5)  
The profit function is identical to this cost function, except that the dependent variable becomes 
ln [(π/w3z3)+θ ] and the composite error term is relabeled as lnu
π  +
 lnε
π .  Costs, profits, and input prices are 
normalized by the price of labor (w3) to impose linear input price homogeneity.4  Costs, profits, variable 
outputs, and fixed netputs are normalized by financial capital (z3) to give the profit model more economic 
meaning, and to control for insolvency risk, heteroskedasticity, scale biases, and other estimation problems.5  
                                                 
4.  Thus, on the efficient frontier, a doubling of all input prices exactly doubles costs.  Although not necessary, we impose 
this constraint on the alternative profit function as well. 
5.  Specifying financial equity capital as fixed helps resolve several estimation problems.  First, high levels of financial 
capital reduce insolvency risk, which reduces costs via lower risk premia on substitutes for other perhaps more costly risk 






Normalized in this way, the dependent variable in the profit functions is essentially the bank￿s return on equity, 
a measure of how well the bank is using its scarce financial capital.  We add 1 to the arguments (yk/z3), (zr /z3), 
and STNPL in order to avoid taking the natural log of zero.  The xn terms, n=1,...,7 are re-scaled values of the 
ln (wi/w3), i=1,2; ln (yk/z3), k=1,2, 3; and ln (zr /z3), r=1,2 terms.  To conserve degrees of freedom, we include 
only the ￿own￿ third-order Fourier terms (e.g., cos(xn + xn + xn)), and exclude the third-order interactions (e.g., 
cos(xn + xm + xq), m, q ≠  n).6  The standard symmetry restrictions apply to the translog portion of the function 
(βij = βji, γkm = γmk, δrs = δsr).  We exclude consideration of factor share equations embodying Shephard’s 
Lemma or Hotelling’s Lemma restrictions because these would impose the undesirable assumption of no 
allocative inefficiencies.  We estimate the cost and profit equations using ordinary least squares. 
3.2  Data and efficiency estimates 
The data are annual observations for all U.S. commercial banks over 1993-1998, and were collected 
from the Reports of Condition and Income (call reports).  There were 10,875 banks in the U.S. in 1993, which 
shrank to 8,713 as of 1998, primarily due to consolidation through M&As.7  We separated the data into two 
samples:  a ￿main sample￿ of institutions that had more than $100 million in gross total assets (1998 dollars) in 
all six years, and a ￿small-bank sample￿ of institutions with less than $100 million in one or more years.  
Annual cost and profit functions were estimated for each sample of banks, using all observations with complete 
data in any given year.  We calculated COSTEFF and PROFEFF for each of the 1,540 banks from the main 
                                                                                                                                                             
has different cost characteristics than deposits: the initial cost of raising capital is high, but interest expense on capital is 
zero.  Third, high levels of financial capital may indicate that managers are risk-averse (i.e., willing to accept lower risk 
in exchange for less than maximum profits and/or less than minimum costs), so including capital prevents us from 
labeling these banks as inefficient even though they are behaving optimally given their risk preferences.  Fourth, failing to 
control for financial capital could yield a scale bias, because large banks tend to be better diversified than small banks, 
and as a result can manage their portfolio risk with lower levels of financial capital. We use an accounting measure of 
equity because market values are unavailable for most banks. 
6.  The Fourier-flexible form is a global approximation because the cos xn, sin xn, cos 2xn, sin 2xn, etc., terms are 
mutually orthogonal over the [0,2π] interval (π  refers here to radians, not profits), so that each additional term can make 
the approximating function closer to the true path of the data wherever it is most needed.  The orthogonality is perfect 
only if the data are evenly distributed over the [0,2π ] interval, but in practice the Fourier terms have improved the fit of 
the data in every application of which we are aware. We cut 10% off each end of the [0,2π ] interval so that the xn span 
[0.1￿2π , 0.9￿2π ] to reduce approximation problems near the endpoints.  The formula for xn is 0.2π  - ￿￿a + ￿￿variable, 
where [a,b] is the range of the variable being transformed, and ￿ ≡  (0.9￿2π  - 0.1￿2π )/(b-a). 
7. The direction of any survivor bias, and how it would affect our results, is not clear a priori.  Many acquired banks 
retain their charters and continue to operate as affiliates of the acquiring organization; these banks remain in our data if 





sample and 6,331 banks from the small-bank sample that were present in all six annual regressions, were at 
least 50% owned by U.S. persons or by a U.S. BHC, and whose lead bank (if the bank was affiliated with a 
multibank BHC) was located in the same geographic region for all six years.  We use these sampling criteria to 
help ensure that the lead bank-affiliate bank relationships in our data are stable across time.    The means and 
standard deviations of the variables used in the cost and profit functions for these samples are shown in Table 
2. 
Although $100 million in assets is an arbitrary threshold, separating the very smallest banks from the 
rest of the population is important for several reasons.  First, small banks generally attract relationship-based 
customers, as opposed to large banks, which tend to produce more transactions-driven services (Kwast, Starr-
McCluer, and Wolken 1997).  Second, these different business strategies may have implications the effects of 
organizational control and distance  on efficiency.  For example, managing and monitoring a small, 
relationship-based bank from afar may be more difficult than managing from the same distance a larger bank 
that sells more generic services.  Third, the variation in costs and profits among the very smallest commercial 
banks is much greater than for the rest of the banking population (Berger and Humphrey 1991), suggesting that 
treating these banks separately may allow for more precise efficiency estimates for the main sample.  We 
include both sets of banks in our analysis to be comprehensive ￿ the small-bank sample comprises nearly 75% 
of industry banks, while the main bank sample contains nearly 90% of industry assets. 
Our efficiency estimates are similar to those found in the literature.  Average measured COSTEFF is 
76.4% for the small banks and 78.0% for banks in the main sample.  This suggests that the typical bank wastes 
about one-quarter of its expenses.  Average measured PROFEFF is 66.3% and 66.8%, respectively, for the 
small-bank and main samples, suggesting that a typical bank forgoes about one-third of its potential profits. 
4.  Bivariate analysis  
Our bivariate analysis consists of two comparisons.  Section 4.1 compares the average efficiency of 
banks located in the same geographic region as their parent organization to the average efficiency of banks 
located in regions different than their parent.  Section 4.2 compares the average efficiency of home-region 
banks in single-region organizations to the average efficiency of home-region banks in multiregional 





nationwide banking organization would require operations in home, contiguous, and noncontiguous regions. 
4.1 Bivariate analysis: Same versus different region from the parent organization  
Table 3 displays the mean values of PROFEFF and COSTEFF for various subsets of our small bank 
and main samples that isolate banks that are managed from within their home regions from banks that are 
managed cross-regionally.8  Row (a) shows the mean cost and profit efficiencies for banks located in the same 
geographic region as their parent organization’s headquarters.  Row (b) shows the mean efficiencies for banks 
located in one of the seven regions other than the one in which their parent organization is headquartered.  
Rows (c) and (d) disaggregate the row (b) data based on whether banks are located in regions that are 
contiguous or noncontiguous to their headquarters’ region (definitions of contiguous regions are shown in the 
table notes). 
Each cell in Table 3 contains, reading from top to bottom, the mean efficiency, number of banks, and 
standard error for the subset of banks in the cell.  To test the effects of distant ownership, we compare the mean 
efficiencies of the banks in rows (b) through (d) to the mean efficiencies of the banks in row (a).  The 
superscripts ** and * (superscripts ## and #) indicate that the average bank is statistically significantly more 
efficient (significantly less efficient) than the average bank in row (a) at the 5 and 10 percent levels, two-sided. 
The data for the main sample indicate that banks located in different geographic regions than their 
parents tend to be somewhat more efficient than average.  Comparing rows (a) and (b) for the main sample, 
banks located outside their headquarters’ regions are more efficient than banks located within their 
headquarters’ regions, by an average of 2.7% of costs (80.5% versus 77.8%).  A larger difference is revealed 
when we differentiate between contiguous and noncontiguous regions.  In row (c), banks in regions contiguous 
to their headquarters have 4.8% better cost efficiency than within-region banks on average (82.0% versus 
77.8%), while in row (d) this difference disappears for banks located in noncontiguous regions.  Although the 
differences in rows (b) and (c) are statistically significant, they are economically small compared to the overall 
variation in cost efficiency.  The standard deviation of COSTEFF is 8.75% and the inter-quartile spread in 
COSTEFF (25
th to 75
th percentiles) is 11.3% for all banks in the main sample.  Hence, these differences do not 
                                                 
8.  We include banks not affiliated with holding companies and banks in one-bank holding companies as being in the 





by themselves provide a strong motivation for cross-regional or nationwide expansion.  Furthermore, the main 
sample data show no statistically significant differences between the profit efficiency of within-region and 
cross-regionally owned banks.   
The results are similar for the small-bank sample.  Small banks located outside their headquarters 
region are statistically more efficient than within-region banks by an average 4.7% of costs (81.0% versus 
76.3%); the average efficiency difference increases to 5.4% of costs and 3.2% of potential profits for small 
banks located in contiguous regions; and the efficiency differences disappear for small banks located at 
noncontiguous distances.  However, these differences are small relative to the standard deviation of 8.73% and 
inter-quartile range of 11.4% for small bank COSTEFF, and even smaller relative to the standard deviation of 
14.49% and inter-quartile range of 18.96% for small-bank PROFEFF.     
These results have several implications.  First, they suggest that cost-efficient organizations may be 
able to spread their superior skills and procedures to banks in nearby states and regions.  Second, they imply 
the existence of organizational diseconomies to operating or monitoring an institution from afar that offset 
these cost efficiencies as banks move further away from their organizational headquarters.  Finally, the weaker 
profit efficiency results imply that superior cost efficiency may be roughly offset by revenue shortfalls in cross-
regionally owned banks, perhaps indicating that it is more difficult to manage revenue generation from a 
distance than to manage bank costs from a distance.  This is most evident in the small bank data, where profit 
efficiency declines by 9.1% between the contiguous and noncontiguous subsamples.  It may be the case that 
organizational diseconomies to operating or monitoring an institution from afar make it especially difficult to 
provide relationship-based products (e.g., small business loans) in which small banks typically specialize 
4.2 Bivariate analysis: Single-region versus multiregional parent organizations 
It seems unlikely that a superregional or nationwide banking organization would be successful without 
being efficient in its home markets.  We evaluate this proposition using the data displayed in Table 4, which 
compares the efficiencies of banks from single-region organizations to the efficiencies of banks from cross-
regional organizations.  Row (a) displays the mean cost and profit efficiencies for banks whose parent 
organizations do not own any banks outside of that geographic region.  Row (b) displays the mean cost and 





and (d) disaggregate the row (b) results based on the contiguous or noncontiguous geographic scope of the 
parent organizations.9   
There are two additional reasons for evaluating the efficiency of the home-region banks.  First, the 
benefits and costs associated with cross-regional diversification can accrue throughout the organization, not 
just in the out-of-region affiliate banks.  Bank holding companies may serve as internal capital markets to 
reallocate funds where they are most productive (Houston, James, and Marcus 1997, Houston and James 1998, 
Klein and Saidenberg 2000).  In addition, senior management￿s attention may become focused on improving 
the efficiency of recently purchased banks in other regions, and unintentionally let the efficiency of the home-
region banks deteriorate.  Second, the results in Table 4 act as a control for accounting anomalies caused by 
inaccurate transfer pricing.  For example, if the lead bank in the organization provides services for the affiliate 
banks (e.g., data or payments processing, advertising and marketing, human resources support, etc.) but does 
not fully price those services, then the superior cost efficiencies that we find for cross-regionally owned banks 
in Table 3 could simply be a reflection of those subsidies.  However, if we find that banks owned by 
multiregional organizations perform better than average regardless of their location, then it is unlikely that 
inaccurate transfer pricing is a problem.  
The results in Table 4 show that on average, home-region banks from multiregional organizations (row 
(b)) are both more cost efficient and more profit efficient than banks from single-region organizations (row 
(a)).  In our main sample, the row (b) banks have statistically significant efficiency advantages equal to 3.5% of 
costs and 2.1% of potential profits, and in our small-bank sample, the row (b) banks have statistically 
significant efficiency advantages equal to 6.2% of costs and 3.5% of potential profits.  Moreover, the average 
difference in cost efficiency widens as the geographic scope of the organization increases.  Cost efficiency 
improves 2.0% and 2.6% of costs, respectively, in the main bank and small-bank samples as the organization 
expands into noncontiguous regions (from row (c) to row (d)).  However, much like our Table 3 analysis, the 
cost efficiency differences are relatively small, and the profit efficiency differences disappear entirely as 
organizations expand into noncontiguous regions.  The latter result implies that problems managing 
organization-wide revenues eventually occur as the geographic scope of the organization expands. 
                                                 





It is difficult to draw strong conclusions from the bivariate analysis shown in Tables 3 and 4 because 
the results mix the efficiency effects of control and distance with an organization￿s choice of geographic 
strategy.  For example, organizations that choose to expand geographically may also be the organizations that 
are best at controlling affiliates at a distance.  We attempt to separate out these effects in the regression analysis 
that follows. 
5.  Regression analysis  
We test the effects of organizational control and distance on affiliate efficiency using the following 
multiple regression framework:  
NONLEADEFF  =    +  1*LEADEFF  +  2*lnDISTANCE  +   3*LEADEFF*lnDISTANCE 
+  4*SAMESTATE  +  5*MSA  +  6*HERF  +  7*lnBKASS  +  8*‰(lnBKASS)
2 
+  9*lnHCASS  +  10*‰ (lnHCASS)
2  +  11*BKMERGE  +  12*HCMERGE 
+  13*REGION +  14*UNMAPPEDNL  +  15*UNMAPPEDL  +  ν .                 (6)  
We estimate (6) separately for cost and profit efficiency and for the main sample and the small-bank sample 
using OLS techniques.  NONLEADEFF is the efficiency (cost or profit) of a non-lead bank affiliate.  
LEADEFF is the same type of efficiency (cost or profit) of the lead bank, defined as the largest banking 
affiliate in the BHC.  We maintain that LEADEFF is a good proxy for the skills, policies, and practices 
available to manage the entire organization.  lnDISTANCE is the natural log of the distance in miles between 
the affiliate bank and its lead bank (one mile added before logging).  SAMESTATE is a dummy equal to one if 
the affiliate is located in the same state as the lead bank.  MSA is a dummy equal to one if the affiliate is 
located in a metropolitan statistical area.  HERF is the affiliate￿s average Herfindahl index, weighted by the 
share of its deposits that come from each MSA or non-MSA county.  BKASS equals the gross total assets of 
the affiliate bank, and HCASS equals the sum of BKASS over all of the bank affiliates in the BHC.  
BKMERGE is a dummy equal to one if the affiliate was the surviving bank in a merger during 1990-1997 in 
which two or more bank charters were consolidated, and HCMERGE is a dummy equal to one if the affiliate 
was acquired by a BHC during 1990-1997 but retained its bank charter.  REGION is a vector of dummies that 
indicate the BEA region in which the affiliate is located.  Summary statistics are displayed in Table 5.  





affiliate banks and lead banks were located.  Although one could contemplate using alternative measures of 
distance between two cities (e.g., actual distance traveled, or total travel time), such measures are not easily at 
our disposal, and in any event these alternative measures are likely highly correlated with lnDISTANCE.  The 
maximum distance was 3,303 miles from Anchorage to Houston and the minimum distance was zero.  The lead 
and non-lead affiliates in our sample were located in 1,912 different U.S. cities, and we were able to match 
1,150 of those cities to an exact geographic location.  We assigned banks in the other 762 unmappable cities to 
the city that is the state￿s banking center, which in most cases is the largest city in the state.10  To partially 
control for the measurement distortion that this introduces, we add the dummies UNMAPPEDNL and 
UNMAPPEDL to equation (6), which equal one when the non-lead bank and the lead bank, respectively, were 
located in an unmappable city.  The degree of measurement distortion should diminish as the non-lead bank 
moves further from the state of its lead bank. 
The derivative NONLEADEFF/LEADEFF = 1+3*lnDISTANCE measures the association 
between lead bank efficiency and non-lead bank efficiency, given the distance between the two banks and 
holding constant the values of the other regressors.  As such, this derivative may reflect the degree to which the 
organization is able to control the operations of its affiliate banks through the transfer of its management skills, 
policies, and practices.  We expect this derivative to be positive if organizations exercise some control over 
their affiliates, but less than 1; a value of 1 would indicate that a given increase in lead bank efficiency would 
be fully matched by an equal increase in non-lead efficiency.  A positive derivative that declines with distance, 
i.e., with 3<0, would be consistent with longer distances interfering with the control of organization over its 
affiliates￿ efficiency. 
The derivative NONLEADEFF/lnDISTANCE = 2+3*LEADEFF reflects the degree to which 
affiliate bank efficiency increases or declines with its distance from the lead bank, given the efficiency of the 
lead bank and holding constant the values of the other regressors.  We have no a priori expectation regarding 
the sign of this derivative.  A negative sign would be consistent with the hypothesis that geographically 
dispersed banking firms experience organizational diseconomies that make it difficult to manage and monitor 
                                                 
10.  We used the largest city in the state, except for in California (San Francisco instead of Los Angeles), Missouri (St. 





affiliates from afar.  A positive sign would be consistent with the hypothesis that efficiently managed 
organizations can overcome any such organizational diseconomies, perhaps in part through the benefits of 
geographic diversification. 
We acknowledge that mismeasurement of LEADEFF (which we measure with estimation error) and 
lnDISTANCE (which we measure with error for unmappable banks) could introduce bias into the estimated 
regression coefficients.  The coefficients on LEADEFF, lnDISTANCE, and LEADEFF*lnDISTANCE may 
each be biased toward zero, making it difficult to reject the null hypothesis associated with these 
coefficients.11  Other biases may be present as well.   The relationship between LEADEFF and 
NONLEADEFF, measured by the estimated sum 1+3*lnDISTANCE could be biased downward if there are 
cross-subsidies (in either direction) between the lead bank and the non-lead affiliate through inaccurate transfer 
pricing or other intra-organizational accounting methods.12  Conversely, this estimated sum could be biased 
upward if the lead bank and its non-lead banks are exposed to common economic shocks not controlled for 
elsewhere in our estimations.13  However, our results below suggest it is unlikely that these biases materially 
affect the conclusions that we draw from our analysis. 
The coefficients on SAMESTATE may be positive, reflecting the benefits of operating under a single 
set of state regulations, or negative because of poor risk diversification.  The coefficients on HERF may be 
positive in the profit efficiency equations and negative in the cost efficiency regressions ￿ consistent with the 
literature (Berger and Mester 1997, Berger and Hannan 1998) ￿ as banks with more market power may raise 
prices and profits, but may have higher costs due to reduced competitive pressures to keep costs under control. 
 The coefficients on MSA may take any sign because of the many differences between metropolitan and rural 
                                                 
11.  We cannot correct for this bias because we know neither the variance of the measurement errors nor their 
covariances with the true values of the variables in question.    
12. Table 5 contains circumstantial evidence of subsidies that flow from lead banks to non-lead banks ￿ lead banks 
(LEADEFF) are on average less cost and profit efficient than non-lead banks (NONLEADEFF) in both the main sample 
and the small-bank sample.  To some extent, these averages simply reflect the fact that banking organizations with large 
numbers of affiliates tend to exhibit above-average affiliate efficiency.  For example, for organizations with 10 or more 
affiliates, mean affiliate cost efficiency was above the sample mean at 24 of 33 organizations, and mean affiliate profit 
efficiency was above the sample mean in 20 of the 33 cases.   
13.  NONLEADEFF and LEADEFF are constructed from the residuals from the same cost and profit functions.  If a non-
lead affiliate and its lead bank experienced a common shock (e.g., a change in economic conditions or a regulatory action 
common to the location of both banks) not controlled for in the functions, then the effects of that shock will be captured 





markets.  We expect the coefficients on lnBKASS and ‰lnBKASS
2 to reveal a positive relationship between 
efficiency and bank size, based on earlier studies that found the smallest banks to be the least efficient (e.g., 
Berger and Humphrey 1991).  We include lnHCASS and ‰lnHCASS
2  to capture the efficiency effects of 
agency costs, internal capital markets, and other factors that may vary with BHC size, and to prevent the 
efficiency effects of our key variable lnDISTANCE from being confounded with the efficiency effects of BHC 
size, which may be strongly related to lnDISTANCE. The coefficients on the BKMERGE and HCMERGE 
variables could be either positive or negative, depending upon the dynamic effects of consolidation on bank 
efficiency. We also have no a priori expectations for the signs on the REGION coefficients, nor for the signs 
on UNMAPPEDNL and UNMAPPEDL.  
5.1  Regression results     
Table 6 displays the results of equation (6) for cost and profit efficiency for both the main sample and 
small-bank sample.  These estimates suggest that on average the efficiency of a non-lead affiliate bank is 
strongly influenced by the efficiency of its lead bank, but not by the distance to its lead bank.  The coefficient 
1 on LEADEFF is positive and highly significant in all four regressions; the coefficient 2 on lnDISTANCE is 
positive but generally insignificant; and the coefficients 3 on the LEADEFF*lnDISTANCE interaction terms 
are negative and generally insignificant.  The derivative NONLEADEFF/LEADEFF = 1+3*lnDISTANCE 
is positive and significantly different from zero at the sample means in all four regressions, consistent with lead 
banks exercising some control over the operations of their affiliate banks through transfers of management 
skills, policies, and practices.  In contrast, the derivative NONLEADEFF/lnDISTANCE = 2+3*LEADEFF 
is not statistically different from zero when evaluated at the sample means in any of the four regressions. 
To see how the control of the parent organization varies with distance, Table 7 shows how the 
estimated value of NONLEADEFF/LEADEFF declines as non-lead banks are increasingly distant from their 
lead banks.  For example, the first column of Table 7 shows that this derivative equals 0.3182 for affiliate 
banks located at 0 miles from their lead banks.  That is, a one percentage point increase in lead bank cost 
efficiency is associated with a 0.3182 percentage point increase in non-lead cost bank efficiency.  However, 
this derivative is only half as large(0.1688) at a distance of 288 miles, the average distance for a main sample 





statistically insignificant at the maximum distance in the main sample.  Figure 1 displays this information 
graphically, plotting each of the four derivatives from Table 7 continuously against the distance between the 
non-lead affiliate and its lead bank.  The figure suggests that organizational control over affiliate bank cost 
efficiency dissipates more with distance than does organizational control over affiliate bank profit efficiency 
(each cost efficiency derivative curve quickly falls below the profit efficiency derivative curve for the same 
sample).  This may indicate that revenue gains from geographic diversification offset a large portion of the 
organizational cost diseconomies that come with geographic dispersion.  The figure also suggests 
organizational control over small bank efficiency dissipates more with distance than does organizational 
control over the efficiency of larger affiliate banks (each small-bank sample curve quickly falls below the main 
sample curve for the same efficiency concept).  This may indicate that organizations experience relatively 
greater difficulties monitoring and managing from a distance relationship-based activities and other locally-
based financial services in which most small banks specialize.  
Our finding of a strong positive relationship between lead bank efficiency and non-lead bank 
efficiency may reflect factors other than organizational control.   As noted above, cross-subsidies in either 
direction between the lead and non-lead banks would tend to give a downward bias to the measured derivative 
NONLEADEFF/LEADEFF, and so our finding of a strong positive effect suggests that such a bias is not 
dominant.  We also noted that there could be an upward bias due to common shocks that affect the measured 
efficiency of the lead and non-lead banks similarly.  To test for the possibility that common shocks are the 
cause of the positive estimated relationship between NONLEADEFF and LEADEFF, we re-estimated (6) after 
adding the interaction variable LEADEFF*SAMESTATE to the right-hand-side of the equation (results shown 
only in Berger and DeYoung 2000).  Common economic shocks are most likely to occur if the lead and non-
lead bank are in the same state, so if common shocks are driving our result, then this interaction variable 
should have a positive coefficient and soak up much of the positive relationship between lead bank and non-
lead bank efficiency.  However, none of these 4 regressions produced a significant positive coefficient on this 
variable, and in most cases the other regression coefficients were materially unaffected.  In the small bank cost 
and profit efficiency regressions, the signs, significance levels, and relative magnitudes of the coefficients 1, 





remained positive and significant, but it was statistically significant only for same-state affiliate banks ￿ a result 
that, if considered in isolation, is consistent with the presence of common local shocks.  But we found no 
evidence of common shocks in the more comprehensive main sample profit regressions ￿ the coefficient on 
LEADEFF*SAMESTATE was significant but negative, and the overall derivative with respect to LEADEFF 
was similar to the Table 6 result in terms of sign, magnitude, and significance level.  Thus, it is unlikely that 
common economic shocks are driving our main result. 
The coefficients on SAMESTATE, HERF, BKASS, HCASS, and BKMERGE are statistically 
significant in at least two of the four Table 7 regressions, with signs that are generally consistent with our 
expectations.  The coefficients on the REGION dummies suggest the non-lead affiliates in the Plains, 
Southeast, Southwest, and Rocky Mountains regions tend to be more profit efficient than those in other 
regions, suggesting favorable economic or regulatory conditions in these regions over this time period.  The 
coefficients on MSA, HCMERGE, UNMAPPEDNL, and UNMAPPEDL are statistically significant in only 
one regression or not at all, and do not have consistent signs across the regressions.   
In Table 8 we use a slightly different procedure for separating the effects of organizational control and 
distance.  We exclude the interaction variable LEADEFF*lnDISTANCE from equation (6), and then estimate 
the model for subsamples of affiliate banks located at various distances from their lead banks.  In panel (a) we 
estimate the model for the full sample of non-lead affiliate banks of multibank BHCs, and panels (b), (c), and 
(d) display estimation results for subsamples of affiliates located in different states from their lead banks, in 
different regions from their lead banks, and in regions noncontiguous to their lead banks, respectively.  
The results in Table 8 suggest that organizational control, geographic distance, and the characteristics 
of individual organizations may all be important determinants of affiliate bank efficiency.  First, the coefficient 
on LEADEFF is always positive, and is statistically significant in 9 of the 16 regressions, reinforcing the earlier 
results that affiliate bank efficiency is strongly correlated with lead bank efficiency.  Second, the coefficients 
generally (but not always) increase in size as the affiliate bank subsamples move further away from the lead 
bank.  For example, in the second column of Table 8 the coefficient on LEADEFF increases from 0.2774 to 
0.3898 to 0.5008 to 0.9141 as geographic dispersion increases.  This suggests that organizations that choose to 





Third, although the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is statistically significant in only 4 of the 16 regressions, all 
four of these coefficients are negative and occur in the out-of-state and out-of-region subsamples where 
distance is likely to be measured accurately and is likely to matter most.14  This is weak evidence of a pure 
distance effect in which increased distance from the lead bank reduces affiliate bank efficiency.  
6.  Individual organization analysis 
In contrast to the previous analyses in which we focused on the average effects of control and distance 
on bank efficiency, we now disaggregate the data and focus instead on the efficiency of affiliates within 
individual multibank organizations.  We attempt to identify whether certain geographic strategies (e.g., 
statewide, regional, or superregional banking) are more often associated with efficient organizations than other 
geographic strategies.  We also attempt to identify whether many, some, or none of the multibank organizations 
in our data are good candidates to sustain nationwide banking organizations in the future.  We note that the 
Riegle-Neal Act currently limits to 10% the total share of nationwide bank and thrift deposits that any 
organization may obtain via M&As, which makes it difficult for any institution to operate a full service 
banking operation on a nationwide basis. 
To make this analysis tractable, we limit our investigation to the 33 organizations in our data with 10 
or more affiliate banks (including the lead bank).  Table 9.1 displays cost efficiency data for these 
organizations, and Table 9.2 displays profit efficiency data for these organizations.15  Data for each of the 33 
organizations is displayed on a separate row.  In column (1), we categorize the geographic scope of each 
organization as either ￿statewide,￿ ￿regional,￿ ￿superregional contiguous,￿ or ￿superregional noncontiguous.￿ 
"Statewide" organizations only own affiliates in their home states.  "Regional" organizations own affiliates 
outside their home states, but not beyond their home regions.  "Superregional contiguous" organizations own 
affiliates outside their home regions, but only in regions that are contiguous to their home regions.   
"Superregional noncontiguous" organizations own affiliates in regions that are not contiguous to their home 
                                                 
14.  Panel (d) contains noncontiguous affiliates for which an additional mile of distance is less meaningful.  Panel (a) 
contains same-state affiliates for which the distance mapping problems are most likely to cause distortions.  
15.  To simplify the analysis, Tables 9.1 and 9.2 do not report separate results for banks in the main sample and small 
bank sample.  This should have little effect on our analysis because, as we report in section 3.1 above, the distributions of 






regions.  We distinguish between ￿superregional contiguous￿ organizations and ￿superregional noncontiguous￿ 
organizations, because the latter have a geographic scope that is closer to nationwide banking and we wish to 
see whether nationwide banking might be an efficient geographic strategy.  While these 33 organizations 
represent just a small fraction of the 733 multibank organizations in the data, they include multibank holding 
companies with a variety of different geographic strategies; as such, analyzing the efficiency of these 
organizations may provide a good indication of whether managers can efficiently operate large numbers of 
affiliates on a statewide, regional, superregional or nationwide basis.16 
Column (2) shows the number of affiliate banks in each of these organizations.  The remainder of the 
columns in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 contain information about the cost and profit efficiency of each organization￿s 
affiliate banks.  Organizations are listed from most cost or profit efficient to least efficient, based on the 
(unweighted) mean efficiencies of their affiliate banks in column (3).  The ordering in Table 9.1 is based on 
cost efficiency rank, and the ordering in Table 9.2 is based on profit efficiency rank.  Columns (4) through (7) 
display the mean efficiencies of affiliate banks that are located at various geographic distances from the lead 
bank.  The superscript "A" identifies cells in which the reported efficiency mean is higher than mean efficiency 
of the affiliates in all 733 multibank organizations in the data.  The superscript "B" shown in column (1) 
identifies organizations whose affiliates have above-average efficiency in each of the geographic locations in 
which the organization operates (i.e., rows in which the superscript ￿A￿ appears in every populated cell in 
columns (4) through (7)).  
There are three main results in Tables 9.1 and 9.2.  First, organizations with 10 or more affiliates tend 
to be more efficient than multibank organizations with smaller numbers of affiliates.  Of the 33 organizations 
shown in these tables, 24 had mean cost efficiencies higher than the 0.7989 average for all affiliates of 
multibank organizations (column (3) in Table 9.1), and 20 had mean profit efficiencies higher than the 0.6931 
average for all affiliates of multibank organizations (column (3) in Table 9.2).  Second, there is evidence that 
some already widely dispersed organizations may be good candidates to sustain nationwide banking 
organizations in the future.  For example, 4 of the 6 superregional noncontiguous organizations in Table 9.2 
                                                 
16.  These 33 organizations with 10 or more affiliates account for 5 of the 549 statewide multibank organizations, 4 of 






operated affiliates with above-average profit efficiency in noncontiguous regions, and for the most part also 
operated efficiently in the areas closer to the organizations￿ headquarters.  Third, among the ￿geographically 
efficient￿ organizations that carry the "B" superscript in the tables, no single geographic scope is dominant.  
Again using profit efficiency as our benchmark, 2 statewide organizations were geographically efficient; 3 
regional organizations were geographically efficient; 3 superregional contiguous organizations were 
geographically efficient; and 2 superregional noncontiguous organizations were geographically efficient.  
Consistent with the results in the prior analyses, this suggests that well-managed organizations can spread their 
efficient management skills/policies/procedures across affiliate banks regardless of the geographic spread of the 
organization. 
7. Conclusions  
We estimate the cost and profit efficiency of over 7,000 U.S. commercial banks between 1993 and 
1998 and use those estimates to assess the impact of geographic expansion on bank efficiency.  We find both 
positive and negative links between geographic scope and bank efficiency.  For example, while banks in 
organizations that expand into nearby states and regions tend to have higher levels of efficiency, organizational 
control over affiliate bank efficiency tends to diminish as affiliates move further away from the parent, 
especially for small bank affiliates with less than $100 million in assets.  But these distance-related efficiency 
effects tend to be modest in size, and our results suggest that efficient parent organizations can export their 
superior skills, policies, and practices to their affiliates and overcome any negative effects of distance.  These 
results imply that operating an efficient banking organization may not necessarily conform to any one particular 
geographic strategy.  An individual organization analysis of a number of large multibank BHCs with varying 
geographic structures confirms this notion. 
These results may have important implications for the future structure of the banking industry.  First, 
the data suggest that domestic banking organizations that operate statewide, across state lines, across 
geographic regions, or nationwide are likely to coexist in the future without any one type of organization 
having a sufficient efficiency advantage to drive the others out of existence.  Such a result would be consistent 
with projections made elsewhere that several thousand banking organizations are likely to disappear during the 
                                                                                                                                                             





adjustment to deregulation, but that the remaining banks will still number in the thousands (e.g., Berger, 
Kashyap, and Scalise 1995).  Our results also suggest that very small banks may be less likely to be efficiently 
owned and operated by nationwide organizations, perhaps due to organizational diseconomies to operating or 
monitoring from afar an institution that specializes in relationship-based lending or locally-oriented services. 
The results may also have some bearing on the debate over why most studies of cross-border bank 
efficiency found that foreign affiliates are on average less efficient than the domestic banks in the same nation. 
To the extent that our findings may extrapolate to cross-border applications, the data suggest  that distance-
related inefficiencies are unlikely to explain the cross-border findings.  If domestic banks can operate 
efficiently at any distance from their parent organizations within a large nation like the U.S., then it is unlikely 
that distance-related inefficiencies are responsible for the finding that domestic banks are usually more efficient 
than foreign banks.  The cross-border findings may be more likely associated with other potential international 
barriers to efficiency ￿ such as differences in language, culture, currency, and regulatory/supervisory structures. 
Some additional important caveats apply to our findings.  First, during our 1993-1998 sample period, 
most interstate banking was done via BHC affiliation, and our efficiency findings for these affiliate banks may 
not apply to future networks of bank branches.  More efficient nationwide geographic scope may be more 
likely in the future, since geographically expansive banking organizations will be able to choose whichever 
organizational form is most efficient for them.  Second, substantial restrictions on interstate acquisitions were 
in place prior to, as well as during the first part, of our sample period.  Future efficiencies from cross-border 
expansion may be higher than found here if the past restrictions mainly prevented efficient organizations from 
expanding.  Third, we do not observe any truly nationwide banking organizations in our data (i.e., 
organizations with conventional deposit-taking offices in all 50 states), and such organizations may be deterred 
in the U.S., given that the Riegle-Neal Act limits the national share of bank and thrift deposits that any single 
organization may obtain by consolidation to 10%.  Therefore, our evaluation of nationwide banking is based on 
extrapolating the existing pattern of cross-regional ownership to a geographical spread that does not presently 
exist and may not occur in the future.  Fourth, technological change may reduce distance-related efficiency 
barriers, enabling organizations to more efficiently process information, market their services, manage across 





we urge great caution in extrapolating these results to other nations or to cross-border applications, given that 
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Correlation Analysis of Bank ROE Among US Regions 
Annual data, 1979-1998 
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Region 

















































































       
New England  1     
(0.106949)       
       
Mideast  0.65875 1     
(0.106738)       
       
Great Lakes  0.02411 0.5008  1    
(0.120448)       
       
Plains  0.10756 0.44102 0.66704 1    
(0.131574)       
       
Southeast  0.84124 0.66657 0.25513 0.3825 1    
(0.126031)       
       
Southwest  0.23662 0.60174 0.25345 0.69174 0.36296 1   
(0.090953)       
       
Rocky Mts.  0.2603 0.4899 0.4365 0.90354 0.46883 0.8772  1 
(0.121841)       
       
Far West  -0.28249 0.28071 0.69177 0.56564 0.07846 0.32124 0.39953  1
(0.107647)       
       
Sources: U.S. bank Call Reports, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
 
Return on equity (ROE) = the aggregate net income for the banks in the region, divided by the aggregate book 
value of equity for the banks in the region. 
 
Regions: New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont); Mideast 
(Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania); Great Lakes (Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin); Plains (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota); 
Southeast (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia);  Southwest (Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas); Rocky 












Banks for which Cost and Profit Efficiency were Calculated 
Means and (Standard Deviations) 
    
  Main Sample  Small Banks 
  (assets > $100 million)  (assets < $100 million)
    
Profits/assets 0.0259  0.0269 
 (0.0124)  (0.0083) 
Costs/assets 0.0416  0.0425 
 (0.0134)  (0.0088) 
Consumer loans/assets  0.1032  0.0854 
 (0.1197)  (0.0593) 
Business loans/assets  0.1470  0.1715 
 (0.0953)  (0.1064) 
Real estate loans/assets  0.3441  0.2967 
 (0.1414)  (0.1327) 
Securities/assets 0.3910  0.4327 
 (0.1285)  (0.1317) 
Off-balance sheet/assets  0.0273  0.0064 
 (0.0439)  (0.0111) 
Equity/assets 0.0913  0.1023 
 (0.0317)  (0.0337) 
Market nonperforming loans/assets  0.000006985  0.00005809 
 (0.000004829)  (0.00005994) 
Price of purchased funds  0.0402  0.0392 
 (0.0035)  (0.0039) 
Price of core deposits  0.0212  0.0246 
 (0.0060)  (0.0065) 
Price of labor ($ thousands, 1998)  40.8716  37.1550 
 (8.9313)  (6.1674) 
Gross total assets ($ millions, 1998)  2,123.76  60.15 
 (12,308.44)  (39.22) 
Number of banks  1,540  6,331 
    
Number of bank-year observations  9,240  37,986 
    
    
Notes:  Costs, profits, variable outputs, fixed outputs, and fixed inputs were all scaled by 









Cost and Profit Efficiency by Geographic Location of Bank 
             




  (greater than $100 million in assets)  (less than $100 million in assets) 
Banks that are located...  COSTEFF PROFEFF COSTEFF PROFEFF 
(a) in the same region as their   0.778 0.663 0.763   0.668
     parent organization.  1439 1439 6214   6214
 0.0023 0.0044 0.0011   0.0019
(b) in a different region than their   0.805 **  0.668 0.810 ***  0.682
     parent organization.  101 101 117   117
 0.0117 0.0221 0.0097   0.0189
(c) in a region that is contiguous to   0.820 ***  0.685 0.817 ***  0.700 ** 
     their parent organization.  73 73 94   94
 0.0138 0.0233 0.0098   0.0169
(d) in a region not contiguous to   0.767 0.624 0.782   0.609  
     their parent organization.  28 28 23   23
 0.0208 0.0514 0.0284   0.0656
  
The three numbers in each cell are the mean efficiency, the number of observations, and the standard error of the 
subsample mean.  The location of the "parent organization" is determined by the location of the lead bank for banks 
affiliated with multi-bank holding companies, or by the location of the bank itself for banks that are either unaffiliated 
or are the sole bank in a one-bank holding company. 
 
***, **, and * indicate that cell mean is significantly higher than the cell in top row at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Regions: New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont); Mideast 
(Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania); Great Lakes (Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin); Plains (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota); 
Southeast (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia);  Southwest (Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas); Rocky Mountain 
(Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming); Far West (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Washington). 
 
The New England region is contiguous with Mideast region. 
The Mideast region is contiguous with New England, Great Lakes, and Southeast regions. 
The Great Lakes region is contiguous with Mideast, Plains, and Southeast regions. 
The Plains region is contiguous with Great Lakes, Southeast, Southwest, and Rocky Mountain regions. 
The Southwest region is contiguous with Plains, Southeast, Southwest, and Far West regions. 
The Rocky Mountain region is contiguous with Plains, Southwest, and Far West regions. 












Cost and Profit Efficiency of Banks by Geographic Spread of Parent Organization 
(Table excludes banks located in a different region from their lead bank.) 




N=6,214 home region banks 
(greater than $100 million in assets)  (less than $100 million in assets) 
 
 
Home-region banks whose  
parent organizations own...  COSTEFF PROFEFF COSTEFF PROFEFF 
(a) only banks in the same region.  0.773 0.660 0.761   0.667
   1225 1225 6016   6016
 0.0024 0.0047 0.0011   0.0019
(b) banks in other regions.  0.808 ***  0.681 *  0.823 ***  0.714 *** 
 214 214 198   198
 0.0064 0.0111 0.0065   0.0127
(c) banks in contiguous regions.  0.801 ***  0.700 ***  0.818 ***  0.729 *** 
 133 133 157   157
 0.0081 0.0132 0.0071   0.0145
(d) banks in noncontiguous regions.  0.821 ***  0.651 0.844 ***  0.657
 81 81 41   41
 0.0103 0.0196 0.0151   0.0245
The three numbers in each cell are the mean efficiency, the number of observations, and the standard error of the 
subsample mean.  The location of the "parent organization" is determined by the location of the lead bank for banks 
affiliated with multi-bank holding companies, or by the location of the bank itself for banks that are either unaffiliated 
or are the sole bank in a one-bank holding company. 
 
***, **, and * indicate that cell mean is significantly higher than the cell in top row at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Regions: New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont); Mideast 
(Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania); Great Lakes (Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin); Plains (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota); 
Southeast (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia);  Southwest (Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas); Rocky Mountain 
(Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming); Far West (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Washington). 
 
The New England region is contiguous with Mideast region. 
The Mideast region is contiguous with New England, Great Lakes, and Southeast regions. 
The Great Lakes region is contiguous with Mideast, Plains, and Southeast regions. 
The Plains region is contiguous with Great Lakes, Southeast, Southwest, and Rocky Mountain regions. 
The Southwest region is contiguous with Plains, Southeast, Southwest, and Far West regions. 
The Rocky Mountain region is contiguous with Plains, Southwest, and Far West regions. 









Summary Statistics for Banks used in Efficiency Regressions, Equation (6). 
 
  425 non-lead banks in 
main sample 
1,277 non-lead banks in 
small-bank sample 
Dependent variables:  mean  std. dev.  Mean  std. dev. 
NONLEADEFF 
(PROFEFF) 
Profit efficiency of non-lead banks 
in multibank BHCs. 
0.6994 0.1697 0.7011 0.1534 
NONLEADEFF 
(COSTEFF) 
Cost efficiency of non-lead banks 
in multibank BHCs. 
0.8099 0.0948 0.8016 0.0926 
Exogenous variables:  mean  std. dev.  Mean  std. dev. 
LEADEFF 
(PROFEFF) 
Profit efficiency of lead bank 
(largest bank in the BHC). 
0.5906 0.1959 0.6834 0.1492 
LEADEFF 
(COSTEFF) 
Cost efficiency of lead bank 
(largest bank in the BHC). 
0.7770 0.0921 0.7853 0.0835 
DISTANCE  Distance in miles between affiliate 
and lead bank. 
310.52 451.08 136.47 247.17 
lnDISTANCE    Natural log of (DISTANCE+1).   4.4761  2.1593  3.8043  1.8852 
SAMESTATE 
  
=1 if affiliate and lead bank are in 
the same state. 
0.5075 0.4922 0.8099 0.3822 
MSA    =1 if affiliate is in a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA). 
0.7361 0.4391 0.3235 0.4667 
HERF  Average Herfindahl index, 
weighted by share of affiliate 
deposits in each MSA or non-MSA 
county in which it operates.  
0.1856 0.0928 0.2573 0.1697 
BKASS  Bank gross total assets (thousands 
of 1998 dollars). 
1,228,302 6,181,149 38,186  23,565 
lnBKASS    Natural log of BKASS.  12.7496  1.2320  10.3351  0.6975 
HCASS  Sum of BKASS for all bank 
affiliates in holding company. 
18,512,914 31,362,826 1,293,720  5,379,763 
lnHCASS    Natural log of HCASS.  15.5522  1.6357  12.3892  1.5322 
BKMERGE  =1 if affiliate in merger, 1990-97.  0.1859  0.3895  0.0227  0.1490 
HCMERGE  =1 if high holding company made 
acquisition, 1990-97. 
0.1035 0.3050 0.1308 0.3373 
REGION1  =1 if affiliate in New England  0.0258  0.1589  0.0039  0.0625 
REGION2  =1 if affiliate in Mideast  0.1459  0.3534  0.0180  0.1330 
REGION3  =1 if affiliate in Great Lakes  0.2341  0.4233  0.2136  0.4098 
REGION4  =1 if affiliate in Plains  0.1365  0.3437  0.3038  0.4601 
REGION5  =1 if affiliate in Southeast  0.2671  0.4423  0.2539  0.4353 
REGION6  =1 if affiliate in Southwest  0.0867  0.2811  0.1299  0.3364 
REGION7  =1 if affiliate in Rocky Mts.  0.0541  0.2265  0.0596  0.2367 
REGION8  =1 if affiliate in Far West  0.0498  0.2170  0.0171  0.1293 
UNMAPPEDL  =1 if location is missing for lead 
bank (location is assigned to state￿s 
largest city or banking center). 
0.1204 0.3078 0.3592 0.4576 
UNMAPPEDNL  =1 if location is missing for 
affiliate bank (location is assigned 
to state￿s largest city or banking 
center). 





Table 6 -- Regression Estimates for Equation (6) 
***, **, and * indicate significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Efficiency concept:  COSTEFF    PROFEFF    COSTEFF   PROFEFF   
Sample:  main   main  small  bank   small  bank   
Intercept -0.2387   -0.4140   -0.7980 *  -1.0473   
  (0.5518)  (0.9139)   (0.4428)  (0.7039)   
LEADEFF 0.3181 *** 0.3133 *** 0.3243 *** 0.2631  ***
  (0.1148)  (0.0833)   (0.0660)  (0.0618)   
LnDISTANCE 0.0173   0.0044   0.0295 **  0.0125   
  (0.0179)  (0.0109)   (0.0125)  (0.0097)   
LEADEFF*lnDISTANCE -0.0264   -0.0085   -0.0398 **  -0.0161   
  (0.0226)  (0.0168)   (0.0159)  (0.0138)   
SAMESTATE  0.0141  0.0693 *** 0.0116  0.0215  * 
  (0.0134)  (0.0223)   (0.0076)  (0.0121)   
MSA  0.0107  -0.0022  0.0011  -0.0172  * 
  (0.0139)  (0.0232)   (0.0063)  (0.0101)   
HERF -0.1103 **  0.2948 *** -0.0112   0.0657  ** 
  (0.0575)  (0.0958)   (0.0185)  (0.0295)   
LnBKASS -0.0037   -0.0693   0.1654 *  0.2840  ** 
  (0.0687)  (0.1145)   (0.0879)  (0.1400)   
‰lnBKASS
2  -0.0005  0.0030   -0.0181 **  -0.0265  * 
  (0.0050)  (0.0083)   (0.0086)  (0.0137)   
LnHCASS 0.1061 **  0.1398   0.0803 *** -0.0154   
  (0.0523)  (0.0877)   (0.0232)  (0.0372)   
‰lnHCASS
2  -0.0060 * -0.0066  -0.0048 *** 0.0015   
  (0.0034)  (0.0056)   (0.0017)  (0.0028)   
BKMERGE 0.0198   0.0521 **  0.0374 **  0.0669  ** 
  (0.0122)  (0.0202)   (0.0171)  (0.0273)   
HCMERGE  0.0082  0.0098   -0.0036  0.0340  ***
  (0.0152)  (0.0253)   (0.0075)  (0.0120)   
REGION1  0.0314  0.0704   0.0146  0.1334  * 
  (0.0345)  (0.0575)   (0.0441)  (0.0703)   
REGION2  -0.0154  0.0506   -0.0057  0.0226   
  (0.0250)  (0.0410)   (0.0271)  (0.0434)   
REGION3  -0.0175  0.0553   -0.0018  0.0485   
  (0.0237)  (0.0391)   (0.0203)  (0.0325)   
REGION4  -0.0073  0.0657 *  0.0006  0.0537  * 
  (0.0240)  (0.0398)   (0.0202)  (0.0322)   
REGION5  -0.0193  0.1261 *** -0.0196  0.0963  ***
  (0.0228)  (0.0377)   (0.0201)  (0.0320)   
REGION6  -0.0358  0.1178 *** -0.0131  0.1423  ***
  (0.0253)  (0.0418)   (0.0205)  (0.0328)   
REGION7  0.0042  0.1503 *** -0.0061  0.1545  ***
  (0.0279)  (0.0468)   (0.0222)  (0.0358)   
UNMAPPEDNL  -0.0001  0.0140   -0.0071  0.0168  * 
  (0.0121)  (0.0203)   (0.0058)  (0.0092)   
UNMAPPEDL  0.0077  0.0264   -0.0042  0.0046   
  (0.0175)  (0.0283)   (0.0057)  (0.0092)   
N 425   425   1277   1277   
R-square 0.1377 0.2382 0.1011   0.1665   







Evaluating    NONLEADEFF/   LEADEFF as mean DISTANCE increases. 
***, **, and * indicate significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Efficiency concept:  COSTEFF   PROFEFF   COSTEFF    PROFEFF  
Sample:  Main    main    small bank    Small bank  
minimum DISTANCE in sample:  0 miles   0 miles   0 miles   0 miles  
point estimate of derivative  0.3182 *** 0.3133 *** 0.3243 *** 0.2631 ***
standard error of derivative  0.1148   0.0833   0.0666   0.0618  
banks in same state:  73 miles   73 miles   81 miles   81 miles  
point estimate of derivative  0.2053 *** 0.2769 *** 0.1499 *** 0.1925 ***
standard error of derivative  0.0532   0.0441   0.0323   0.0298  
banks in same region, different states:  288 miles   288 miles   188 miles   188 miles  
point estimate of derivative  0.1688 *** 0.2652 *** 0.1161 *** 0.1789 ***
standard error of derivative  0.0591   0.0503   0.0387   0.0342  
banks in contiguous regions:  597 miles   597 miles   368 miles   368 miles  
point estimate of derivative  0.1495 **  0.2590 *** 0.0893 *  0.1680 ***
standard error of derivative  0.0681   0.0573   0.0461   0.0399  
banks in noncontiguous regions:  1297 miles   1297 miles   1278 miles   1278 miles  
point estimate of derivative  0.1495 **  0.2590 *** 0.0893 *  0.1680 ***
standard error of derivative  0.0681   0.0573   0.0461   0.0399  
maximum DISTANCE in sample:  2825 miles   2825 miles   3303 miles   3303 miles  
point estimate of derivative  0.1084   0.2458 *** 0.0018   0.1327 ** 















Derivative of affiliate bank efficiency (NONLEADEFF) with respect to 
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Selected Regression Results for Subsample Estimates of Equation (6) 
***, **, and * indicate significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
dependent variable:  COSTEFF    PROFEFF    COSTEFF   PROFEFF   
sample:  main   main  small  bank   small  bank   
(a) full sample:          
LEADEFF 0.1996 *** 0.2774 *** 0.1760 *** 0.1996 ***
  (0.0530)  (0.0441)   (0.0308)  (0.0291)   
lnDISTANCE  -0.0031  0.0005   -0.0018  0.0015   
  (0.0031)  (0.0052)   (0.0016)  (0.0026)   
N 425   425   1277   1277   
R-square 0.1348 0.2552 0.0966   0.1656   
Adjusted R-square  0.0919 0.2183 0.0822   0.1524  
(b) out-of-state affiliates only:          
LEADEFF  0.1098  0.3898 *** 0.0759  0.0840   
  (0.0903)  (0.0725)   (0.0843)  (0.0786)   
lnDISTANCE -0.0037   -0.0420 **  -0.0128 *  -0.0015   
  (0.0108)  (0.0168)   (0.0073)  (0.0135)   
N  207  207   244  244   
R-square  0.0931  0.2697   0.1181  0.2303   
Adjusted  R-square  -0.0045  0.1912   0.0390  0.1612   
(c) out-of-region affiliates only:          
LEADEFF 0.1400   0.5008 *** 0.2748 **  0.4002  ***
  (0.1390)  (0.1123)   (0.1152)  (0.1072)   
lnDISTANCE -0.0063   -0.0492 *  -0.0266 **  -0.0145   
  (0.0163)  (0.0267)   (0.0106)  (0.0195)   
N  113  113   127  127   
R-square  0.1893  0.3556   0.3184  0.3793   
Adjusted  R-square  0.0130  0.2156   0.1973  0.2690   
(d) noncontiguous region affiliates only:          
LEADEFF  0.6325  0.9141 *** 0.5471  0.6042   
  (0.4288)  (0.1389)   (0.5674)  (0.6298)   
lnDISTANCE    0.0007  0.1189   0.0878  0.2562   
  (0.0760)  (0.0874)   (0.0862)  (0.4075)   
N  31  31   25  25   
R-square  0.5258  0.8963   0.8477  0.6949   








Cost Efficiency, Individual Organization Analysis 
Data for banks in 33 BHCs that own at least 10 affiliate banks, ordered by the mean cost efficiency of those affiliates. 
"Statewide" BHCs only own affiliates in their home states.  "Regional" BHCs own affiliates outside their home states, but 
not beyond their home regions.  "Superregional, contiguous" BHCs own affiliates outside their home regions, but not 
beyond regions that are contiguous to the BHC.  "Superregional, noncontiguous" BHCs own affiliates outside their home 
regions, including regions that are not contiguous to the BHC.  The superscript 
A indicates a mean cost efficiency greater 
than 0.7989, which is the mean COSTEFF for all affiliates of multi-bank holding companies in our data.  The superscript 
B indicates a BHC whose affiliates have mean cost efficiencies greater than 0.7989 in each of the geographic locations in 
which it operates.   
 
Mean cost efficiency for banks located in:   
(1) 
 


































B 13  .9027  .9027 
A      
superregional, contiguous 














superregional, noncontiguous  26  .8733  .8772 
A     .7775 
statewide 
B 10  .8683  .8683 
A      
superregional, noncontiguous  27  .8639  .8734 
A     .6167 
superregional, contiguous  15  .8601  .8662 
A   .7750   
statewide 
B 10  .8356  .8356 
A      
superregional, noncontiguous 






B 28  .8285  .8181 
A .8343 
A    
regional 
B 10  .8275  .8041 
A .8509 
A    
superregional, contiguous 
B 10  .8255  .8073 
A   .9893 
A  
superregional, noncontiguous  13  .8240  .8890 
A .8192 
A .6613 .7643 
superregional, contiguous  12  .8215  .8339 
A .7918  .8388 
A  




B 12  .8140  .8221 
A .8114 
A    
superregional, contiguous  13  .9132  .8093 
A .7904  .8539 
A  




superregional, noncontiguous  20  .8103  .8205 
A .7077  .9006 
A .7681 
superregional, contiguous  15  .8029  .7906  .8451 
A .7823   
superregional, contiguous  21  .7995  .8198 
A .6681  .7279   
statewide 
B 13  .7994  .7994 
A      
superregional, contiguous  22  .7974  .8006 
A .8051 
A .7262   
superregional, contiguous  10  .7889  .7946    .7659   
superregional, contiguous  10  .7882  .7782    .8786 
A  
regional 35  .7834  .7655  .8138 
A    
superregional, contiguous  13  .7829  .8808 
A .7626  .7914   
statewide 10  .7745  .7745       
superregional, contiguous  11  .7675  .7613    .7751   
superregional,  contiguous  12  .7494 .7515 .6987  .7980   










Profit Efficiency, Individual Organization Analysis 
Data for banks in 33 BHCs that own at least 10 affiliate banks, ordered by the mean profit efficiency of those affiliates. 
"Statewide" BHCs only own affiliates in their home states.  "Regional" BHCs own affiliates outside their home states, but 
not beyond their home regions.  "Superregional, contiguous" BHCs own affiliates outside their home regions, but not 
beyond regions that are contiguous to the BHC.  "Superregional, noncontiguous" BHCs own affiliates outside their home 
regions, including regions that are not contiguous to the BHC.  The superscript 
A indicates a mean profit efficiency 
greater than 0.6931, which is the mean PROFEFF for all affiliates of multi-bank holding companies in our data.  The 
superscript 
B indicates a BHC whose affiliates have mean profit efficiencies greater than 0.6931 in each of the geographic 
locations in which it operates. 
 
Mean profit efficiency for banks located in:   
(1) 
 





























superregional, contiguous 21  .9051 .9173 
A .6603 
superregional, contiguous  15  .8448  .8944 
A .6368  .8178 
A  
regional 
B  35 .8036  .8008 
A .8084 
A    
superregional, noncontiguous 






B 10  .7858  .7848 
A      




B 26  .7746  .7697 
A     .8973 
A 
superregional, contiguous 









B 13  .7419  .7419 
A      
regional 
B 12  .7308  .7231 
A .7333 
A    
superregional, contiguous   12  .7278  .6709  .6566  .8564 
A  




B 28  .7166  .7304 
A .7089 
A    
 superregional, contiguous 
B 11  .7129 .7264 
A   .6966 
A  




superregional, contiguous  22  .7110  .7182 
A .7065 
A .5725   
superregional, contiguous  21  .7105  .7269 
A .7160 
A .6150   
superregional, contiguous  10  .7006  .7007 
A .7227 
A .6817   




 superregional, contiguous  10  .6920  .6931    .6875   
superregional, contiguous  15  .6909  .7299 
A .5184  .6058   
statewide 10  .6861  .6861       
regional 10  .6791  .6578  .7005 
A    
 superregional, contiguous  10  .6662  .6693    .6389   
superregional,  contiguous  15  .6642 .6433 .6693 .6958 
A  
 superregional, contiguous  15  .6197  .6331    .8823 
A  
 superregional, contiguous  10  .6462  .6439    .6667   
superregional, contiguous  10  .6349  .6872  .7585 
A .4654   
superregional,  contiguous  12  .6238 .5603 .6161 .6952 
A  
statewide 10  .6166  .6166       
statewide 13  .5847  .5847       
 superregional, noncontiguous  27  .5644  .5671      .4947 
 
 
 